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Returns to farmland ownership
by William Edwards, extension economist, 515-294-6161,
wedwards@iastate.edu, Don Hofstrand, extension farm management
specialist, 515-423-0844, dhof@iastate.edu
Below are estimates ofthe average returnsfrom owning Iowa
farmland since 1970. Annual
returns are in two forms: cash
income and change in market
value. Total return is the sum
of these two.
Results over the entire
period
Cash returns — As shown in
Table 1, the rate of cash return
has been relatively stable since
1970. Returns dropped to 5.3
percent during the early 1980s
due to the rapid inflationary
rise in land value. Conversely,
the rate rose to 9.7 percent
later due to the plunge in land
values during the financial
crisis of the late 1980s. The
average over the period from
1970 to 2002 was 7.5 percent.
Land value change — The
return due to changes in land
values was much more volatile,
Cash returns
Cash rental rates are used as
estimates of the cash returns
to farmland. The rate of cash
return (percent) each year is
computed by dividing the cash
rental rate by the market
value of land.
Cash rental rates are a gross
return, not a net return, be-
cause property taxes and other
ownership expenses have not
been deducted. These will
probably reduce the total
return by one to two percent-
age points.
Increase (decrease) in
value
Another form of return is the
annual increase (decrease) in
the market value of farmland.
This increase (decrease) is
computed as a percentage
change in value from one year
to the next.
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Handbook Updates
For those of you subscribing
to the Ag Decision Maker
Handbook, the following
updates are included.
Crop Planning Prices—
A1-10 (1 page)
Livestock Planning
Prices—B1-10 (1 page)
Please add these files to
your handbook and remove
the out-of-date material.
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ranging from a high of 36.8 percent in 1977 to a
low of negative 28.1 percent in 1985. Over the
entire period, land values increased by an
average of 5.9 percent per year.
Total returns — The total return (annual cash
return plus change in land value) was 13.4
percent per year. It ranged from a low of a
negative 19.1 percent in 1985 to a high of 43.1
percent in 1977.
Results by financial period
Rates of return have varied greatly during
specific time periods over the past thirty-three
years. The rates of return during the farm boom
period, farm crisis period and the current period
are shown in Table 2.
Farm boom period — During the farmland
boom period of 1970 through 1981, land values
increased rapidly (15 percent on average)
providing a total return of 22.3 percent. It
should be noted that cash rental rates and land
values for the decade before 1970 were very
stable. Farmland values and rental rates
started their rapid rise in 1973/74 when grain
shortages pushed prices to extremely high
levels.
continued on page 3
Table 1. Returns to farmland ownership per year (per acre).
 Whole Cash Rent as Percentage
Farm  Market Land Percent of Change in Total
Year Cash Rent Value Land Value Land Value Percentage Return
2002 $116 $1980 5.9% 4.2% 10.1%
2001 114 1900 6.0 4.4 10.4
2000 112 1820 6.2 2.8 9.0
1999 109 1,770 6.2 4.1 10.3
1998 109 1,700 6.4 6.3 12.7
1997 106 1,600 6.6 10.3 17.0
1996 107 1,450 7.4 7.4 14.8
1995 102 1,350 7.6 5.5 13.0
1994 100 1,280 7.8 5.6 13.4
1993 102 1,212 8.4 5.1 13.5
1992 101 1,153 8.8 1.2 10.0
1991 97 1,139 8.5 4.5 13.0
1990 96 1,090 8.8 -0.5 8.4
1989 91 1,095 8.3 15.6 23.9
1988 82 947 8.7 20.5 29.1
1987 76 786 9.7 -10.0 -0.3
1986 83 873 9.5 -20.0 -10.5
1985 98 1,091 9.0 -28.1 -19.1
1984 109 1,518 7.2 -3.2 4.0
1983 106 1,568 6.8 -13.0 -6.2
1982 106 1,802 5.9 -7.2 -1.3
1981 102 1,941 5.3 7.2 12.4
1980 96 1,811 5.3 16.8 22.1
1979 89 1,550 5.7 16.5 22.2
1978 82 1,331 6.2 5.7 11.9
1977 79 1,259 6.3 36.8 43.1
1976 69 920 7.5 28.0 35.5
1975 60 719 8.3 20.4 28.8
1974 53 597 8.9 28.1 37.0
1973 39 466 8.4 12.6 20.9
1972 35 414 8.5 5.6 14.1
1971 34 392 8.7 0.0 8.7
1970 33 392 8.4 2.6 11.0
Source: USDA Annual Survey of Agricultural Land Values and Cash Rents.
Cash rental rates for 1995 through 2002 are estimates.
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Farm crisis period – During the farm crisis of
1982 through 1987, land value declined rapidly
– an average of 13.6 percent per year. As noted
previously, cash returns actually increased
during this period because land value dropped
faster than rental rates. However, the land
value declines more than offset cash returns
and the total return was a negative 5.6 percent.
Current period – During the period after the
farm crisis and up to the current time (1988 –
2002), land values and rental rates resumed
their upward trend, although slower than
during the boom period. The average rate of
return during this period is similar to the aver-
age rate of return over the entire period.
Results by alternative land purchase
dates
Rates of return on farmland investments vary
greatly depending on when farmland is pur-
chased. In Table 3, farmland is assumed to be
purchased at three different time-periods; the
beginning of the boom period (1970), the end of
the boom period (1981) and
the end of the crisis period
(1987). The rates of return
for each of these three
investment period are
shown in Table 3.
Beginning of boom
period (1970) – A typical
Iowa farmland purchase in
1970 would have been $392 per acre. The value
of the farmland 32 years later in 2002 was
$1,980, for an increase of 405 percent or 13
percent per year. The average cash return over
the period was 22 percent. This was computed
by dividing the cash rental rate for each year
by the $392 purchase price. The cash return
was 30 percent in 2002 when cash rent was
$116 per acre.
End of boom period (1981) – A farmland
purchase in 1981 would have been for $1,941
per acre. The value 21 years later in 2002 was
two percent higher. The average cash return
over the period was five percent. The cash
return was six percent in 2002 when cash rents
were $116 per acre.
End of the crisis period (1987) – In 1987
farmland value was $786 per acre. The value in
2002, 15 years later, was $1,980 for an increase
of 152 percent or 10 percent per year. The
average cash return over the period was 13
percent. The cash return in 2002 was 15 per-
cent.
Table 2. Returns to farmland by time period.
Cash rent as Percentage
percent of change in Total percentage
Time period value land value return
Boom period—1970-81 7.3% 15.0% 22.3%
Farm crisis—1982-87 8.0 -13.6 -5.6
Current period—1988-02 7.4 6.5 13.9
Entire period—1970-02 7.5 5.9 13.4
Table 3. Returns to farmland ownership by purchase date
Average annual
Percent rent as
 increase percent of
Ownership period Purchase price 2002 Price in price purchase price*
Beginning of boom period to present (1970 – 2002) $392 $1,980 405% 22%
End of boom period to present (1981 – 2002) 1,941 1,980 2 5
End of crisis period to present (1987- 2002) 786 1,980 152 13
*The cash return per year is computed by dividing the cash rental rate for each year during the time period by the farmland purchase price. An
average cash return is then computed for the time period.
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In South Dakota Farm Bureau, Inc. et. al. v.Hazeltine, the U.S. Court of Appeals for theEighth Circuit upheld the Federal District
Court for the District of South Dakota and ruled
the South Dakota anti-corporate farming law
unconstitutional on “dormant commerce clause”
grounds. The opinion is viewed as critical to the
future viability of anti-corporate farming re-
strictions in other states and, more generally, to
the ability of state legislatures to shape the
structure of agriculture within their borders.
Anti-corporate farming restrictions
Presently, nine states prohibit corporations
from engaging in agriculture to various degrees.
Recently, consolidation in almost every aspect
of the farm economy has further threatened the
continued viability of a vibrant, independently
owned and widely dispersed farm production
sector with the specter of being vertically inte-
grated (largely through contractual arrange-
ments) in the production, processing and mar-
keting functions. Thus, as concentration of
agricultural production has accelerated in
recent years, legislatures in many of these same
states have attempted to legislate protections
for the economic autonomy of individual farm-
ers and the environmental health and safety of
both the rural and non-rural sectors.
South Dakota provision
The South Dakota restriction dates from 1974,
and in 1998 South Dakota voters amended the
state constitution (known as “Amendment E”) to
prohibit corporations and syndicates from
owning an interest in farmland (with numerous
exceptions). Section 21 states:
“no corporation or syndicate may acquire,
or otherwise obtain an interest, whether
legal, beneficial, or otherwise, in any real
estate used for farming in this state, or
engage in farming.”
Section 22 exempts “family farm corpora-
tions” or “family farm syndicates” as fol-
lows:
“a corporation or syndicate engaged in
farming or the ownership of agricultural
land, in which a majority of the partner-
ship interests, shares, stock, or other
ownership interests are held by members of
a family or a trust created for the benefit of
a member of that family. The term, family,
means natural persons related to one
another within the fourth degree of kinship
according to civil law, or their spouses. At
least one of the family members in a family
farm corporation or syndicate shall reside
on or be actively engaged in the day-to-day
labor and management of the farm. Day-to-
day labor and management shall require
both daily or routine substantial physical
exertion and administration.”
The plaintiffs, a collection of farm groups, South
Dakota feedlots, public utilities and other farm
organizations, challenged Amendment E on the
basis that it would prevent the continuation of
their existing farming enterprises unless those
enterprises changed organizationally to come
within a statutory exemption. Specifically,
several of the plaintiffs feed livestock in their
South Dakota feedlots under contracts with out-
of-state firms and claimed that Amendment E
would apply to their out-of-state contracting
parties and hurt economically their South
Dakota livestock feeding businesses.
“Dormant Commerce Clause”
The Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution
(Article I, ◊8, Clause 3) forbids discrimination
against commerce, which repeatedly has been
held to mean that states and localities may not
discriminate against the transactions of out-of-
state actors in interstate markets even when
Is there a future for legislative involvement in
shaping the structure of agriculture?
by Roger McEowen, assistant professor of agricultural economics and exten-
sion specialist, agricultural law and policy, Kansas State University.
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the Congress has not legislated on the subject.
The overriding rationale of the commerce
clause was to create and foster the development
of a common market among the states and to
eradicate internal trade barriers. Thus, a state
may not enact rules or regulations requiring
out-of-state commerce to be conducted accord-
ing to the enacting state’s terms.
Historically, dormant commerce clause analysis
has attempted to balance national market
principles with federalism, and was never
intended to eliminate the states’ power to
regulate local activity, even though it is inci-
dentally related to interstate commerce. In-
deed, if state action also involves an exercise of
the state’s police power, the impact of the
action on interstate commerce is largely ig-
nored. Absent an exercise of a state’s police
power, the courts evaluate dormant commerce
clause claims under a two-tiered approach. If
the state has been motivated by a discrimina-
tory purpose, the state bears the burden to
show that it is pursuing a legitimate purpose
that cannot be achieved with a nondiscrimina-
tory alternative. However, if the state regulates
without a discriminatory purpose but with a
legitimate purpose, the provision will be upheld
unless the burden on interstate commerce is
clearly excessive in relation to the benefits that
the state derives from the regulation. In es-
sence, a state may regulate transactions that
occur within its borders, but not those that
occur elsewhere.
“Dormant Commerce Clause” precedent
in the eighth circuit
In Hampton Feedlot, et. al. v. Nixon, the court
upheld against a dormant commerce clause
challenge provisions of the Missouri Livestock
Marketing Law that the state legislature
passed in 1999 preventing livestock packers
that purchase livestock in Missouri from dis-
criminating against producers in purchasing
livestock except for reasons of quality, trans-
portation costs or special delivery times. The
law requires any differential pricing to be
published. The trial court held the law to be
unconstitutional, but the Eighth Circuit re-
versed. While the court noted that the Act
closely resembled an earlier South Dakota law
that had been found unconstitutional, the court
noted that noted that the Missouri provision did
not eliminate any method of sale – it simply
requires price disclosure. More importantly,
however, the court noted that the Missouri
statute, unlike the South Dakota provision, only
regulates the sale of livestock sold in Missouri.
As such, the extraterritorial reach that the court
found fatal to the South Dakota statute was not
present in the Missouri statute. The court
reasoned that the statute was indifferent to
livestock sales occurring outside Missouri and
had no chilling effect on interstate commerce
because packers could easily purchase livestock
other than in Missouri to avoid the Missouri
provision. The court also noted that the Missouri
legislature had legitimate reasons for enacting a
price discrimination statute, including preserva-
tion of the family farm and Missouri’s rural
economy, and an improvement in the quality of
livestock marketed in Missouri. Specifically, the
court opined that the Missouri legislature had
the authority to determine the course of its
farming economy and that the legislation was a
constitutional means of doing so.
Hazeltine court’s rationale
In a discussion involving the issue of the plain-
tiffs’ standing, the court in Hazeltine cited an
Ohio statute that charged out-of-state natural
gas vendors at a higher sales tax rate than
certain in-state vendors. The court reasoned
that the South Dakota livestock feeders con-
tracting with out-of-state firms that were not
within an exemption under the South Dakota
law were similarly disaffected because of the
imminent loss of business if Amendment E were
to be enforced. However, the court did not dis-
cuss the obvious difference between the Ohio
statute and Amendment E. The Ohio statute
treated out-of-state natural gas vendors differ-
ently from in-state vendors. Amendment E
treats all businesses operating in South Dakota
under the same set of rules, regardless of
whether the business is a South Dakota busi-
ness or an out-of-state enterprise. Under the
Hampton rationale, the test is whether Amend-
ment E has an extraterritorial reach requiring
business transactions conducted in states other
continued on page 6
. . . and justice for all
The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) prohibits
discrimination in all its programs and activities on the basis of
race, color, national origin, gender, religion, age, disability,
political beliefs, sexual orientation, and marital or family status.
(Not all prohibited bases apply to all programs.) Many
materials can be made available in alternative formats for ADA
clients. To file a complaint of discrimination, write USDA,
Permission to copy
Permission is given to reprint ISU Extension
materials contained in this publication via copy
machine or other copy technology, so long as the
source (Ag Decision Maker Iowa State
University Extension ) is clearly identifiable
and the appropriate author is properly credited.
Office of Civil Rights, Room 326-W, Whitten Building, 14th
and Independence Avenue, SW, Washington, DC 20250-9410
or call 202-720-5964.
Issued in furtherance of Cooperative Extension work, Acts of
May 8 and June 30, 1914, in cooperation with the U.S.
Department of Agriculture. Stanley R. Johnson, director,
Cooperative Extension Service, Iowa State University of
Science and Technology, Ames, Iowa.
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than South Dakota to be governed in accor-
dance with South Dakota law, not whether
South Dakota businesses are financially injured
because of business relations with companies
not coming within an exemption to the law.
While the court was addressing legal standing
on this point, the court was also framing the
dormant commerce clause issue. Unbelievably,
the court did not make even a single reference
to its prior opinion in Hampton Feedlot.
The court also provided no analysis on the issue
of what entity is actually performing farming
operations under the contract feeding arrange-
ments. If the South Dakota feeding operations
are making the relevant production decisions
under the contracts and are the ones rendering
material participation, then it seems highly
unlikely that the out-of-state contracting par-
ties could be found to be engaged in farming in
South Dakota in a manner that Amendment E
prohibits. The court, again without discussing
the matter, simply assumed that Amendment E
would apply to the contract feeding situations in
the case.
Without any analysis of the actual language of
Amendment E, the court determined that South
Dakota voters had acted with a discriminatory
purpose in enacting Amendment E. The court
noted that the record contained a substantial
amount of evidence on the point. The court also
found relevant on the discrimination issue
statements of drafters, as well as a statement of
a co-chairman of the Amendment E promotional
organization that Amendment E was motivated
in part by the environmental problems caused
by large-scale hog operations in other states.
The court called this statement “blatant” dis-
crimination. The court also found indirect
evidence of discrimination in that the drafters
and supporters of Amendment E had no evi-
dence that a ban on corporate faming would
preserve family farms or protect the environ-
ment, and that no economic studies had been
undertaken to determine the economic impact
of “shutting out corporate entities from farming
in South Dakota.” Because the court found that
Amendment E was enacted with a discrimina-
tory purpose, the state bore the burden to show
that it had no other way to advance legitimate
state interests. The court held that the state
failed to meet its burden.
Implications of the decision
If left standing, the Hazeltine court’s opinion
raises serious concerns about the analysis of
future dormant commerce clause cases in the
Eighth Circuit, the doctrine of stare decisis, the
theory of separation of powers and the ability of
states to regulate business conduct within their
borders. The court’s willingness to ignore it’s
prior opinion in Hampton Feedlot and not
evaluate the actual language of Amendment E
on a dormant commerce clause grounds poses
difficulty for other states defending against
either current or future challenges to anti-
corporate farming laws. It would appear at this
time, however, that the court is not favorably
disposed to anti-corporate farming laws in
general, and may also strike down other laws
designed to deal with the structural conditions
presently facing family farming and ranching
operations. The court’s opinion represents a
complete shift from its opinion in Hampton
Feedlot, and the court appears to have adopted
the modern economic theory of free trade as its
framework for evaluating commerce clause
cases involving state regulation of business
activity. Unfortunately, the court failed to note
that the types of production contract arrange-
ments involved in the case have been used in
other settings to provide vertically integrated
firms with market power and to exclude produc-
ers from competitive market outlets for their
products.
It is hoped that the Eighth Circuit will recon-
sider its decision in Hazeltine and continue the
judicial path laid down in Hampton Feedlot.
